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Summary  findings
Should deposit insurance be recommended? No. History  the government is willing to reduce competition,  allow
reaches three lessons:  right cartelization, and impose tight supervision and
* Deposit insurance was not adopted primarily to  control, deposit insurance can work for at least 20 years.
protect the depositor. There were many ways to increase  The public is greatly concerned about the safety of its
the soundness of the banking system, and the problems  deposits and U.S. financial history is littered with
of deposit insurance were well-known from the state  schemes to protect depositors or note holders. The
experiments that preceded the FDIC. The leading  designs of these systems  were influenced by special
alternative with which contemporaries  had experience  interests but were also driven by the public's desire for
was to allow branching and the diversification of  protection. The key problem is one of information:  For
institutions by geography and product line. But monetary  households and small businesses, it is costly to monitor
contraction and the politics of the banking crisis  the performance of banks and decide which is safest,
empowered small banks instead.  especially when the economy is subject to fluctuations.
* The history of federal and state insurance plans  What plan could a policymaker offer that would not
shows that it is all hut impossible to escape the moral  have all the perverse effects of deposit insurance? There
hazard and other problems inherent in deposit insurance,  is a strong historical precedent for at least one
as Canada learned when it adopted it in 1967.  alternative: regulators could require each bank to offer
* In setting up banking regulations, including deposit  deposit accounts that are segregated, treasury-bill mutual
insurance, a banking lobby will be created that will  funds. This type of account is effectively insurance from
campaign to protect the industry as it stands, and the  the government, with the same guarantee as government
industry will be pushed on a course that will be difficult  bonds, but without the wrong incentives for financial
to alter. The state experience also contains a lesson: If  institutions that arise from deposit insurance.
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Tables  and FiguresDespite its imperfections, the U.S. financial system remains a very attractive model for architects of
financial systems in developing countries and transition economies. The U.S. system efficiently transfers
and redistributes funds from one sector to another with a high degree of safety and soundness. Of all the
U.S. financial system's components, the banking sector is perhaps the weakest. And yet even this part of
the system may look good to developing countries and policymakers.
.;  The U.S. banking sector includes all the institutions that take deposits and make loans, including
commercial banks, savings and loans, savings banks, and credit unions. To examine the development of
deposit insurance and its role in the performance of the U.S. banking sector, it is important to focus on
the big picture: the banking sector in the United States has become less important over time. Relative to
other parts of the financial system, the banking sector has undergone a very slow and almost steady
contraction throughout the twentieth century. For example, in 1900 commercial banks held
approximately two-thirds of the assets of all financial intermediaries. This ratio has fallen steadily, and
today commercial banks hold less than one-third of these assets. Although several factors underlie this
decline, the leading factor has been regulation. Regulation has come from both the federal government
and from state govemments. It has constrained the expansion of banks and contributed to the widespread
failure of individual institutions.
This chapter analyzes the role of deposit insurance in depository institutions, focusing on
commercial banks. Commercial banks are still, by far, the largest group of depository institutions and
their experience is representative. Severe geographic and product line constraints are the central
problems of banks in the twentieth-century United States. These constraints have prevented them from
meeting the changing needs of their houselhold  and business customers and weakened their ability to
withstand external shocks. Over the course of the twentieth century customer demand for long-term
credit has increased. Households have wanted to purchase houses, plan for retirement, and pay for their
children's education. Businesses have wanted to increase their capital stock and expand their plant and
equipment. Yet the character of U.S. commercial banks was defined in the nineteenth century, duringwhich they were essentially institutions that provided short-term credit. This focus is the result of the
prevailing nineteenth century banking doctrine, the real bills doctrine, which held that banks would only
be considered sound if they offered loans to finance the production and distribution of goods. Thus banks
were prohibited from holding equity and restricted in their holding of debt with long-term maturities.
Complicating this picture was the general prohibition on branch banking. In most states banks were
forced to operate out of a single office. This constraint produced a highly fragmented industry-at  its
largest, there were 30,000 commercial banks in the United States.
As a result of this evolution banks could not grow in size or sophistication and thus could not
meet the needs of their growing bu§iness customers as the economy entered the era of the modern
corporation. Branching restrictions forced U.S. banks to remain small relative to the emerging industrial
enterprises. Furthermore, restricting banks to one geographic area created small banks that found it
difficult to diversify their deposit base and their loan portfolio. Consequently, they were prone to suffer
or even fail when they were hit by external economic shocks. When commercial banks were formed in
the middle of the nineteenth century, their design was appropriate for an economy of small firms and
local markets. But by the beginning of the twentieth century it was clearly inappropriate.
Indeed, the history of U.S. banking in the twentieth century can be partly read as an attempt to
escape regulation. To avoid geographic constraints, banks used legal loop-holes to acquire other banks,
change the law if they could, and when they failed, created surrogate forms-bank  holding companies
and chain banks. Although larger institutions were built, particularly in California and New York, the
industry remained fragmented by any European standard. On the side of product-line restraints, banks
moved into a variety of new activities where the law permitted, including trust activities and financial
advice.
The most important diversification in the twentieth century came in investment banking and the
brokerage business. Blocked by laws that prevented them from holding equity, commercial banks
2responded in the  1920s by setting up wholly owned securities affiliates that could enter investment
banking and brokerage without restrictions. The larger banks had an advantage because they recognized
that they had lost their biggest business customers to investment banks. Profiting from the restrictions on
commercial banks, investment banks had created the huge U.S. market for equities and long-term debt to
meet nineteenth-century industry's need for long-term financing. The commercial banks' securities
affiliates gave them a new vehicle for competing with investment banks. Now commercial banks could
hiandle  firms' short-term credit needs through their ordinary operations and their long-term credit needs
through securities affiliates. In fact these two activities-were complementary in information gathering;
servicing customers, and diversifyihg their portfolios to insulate banks from business cycle fluctuations.
Securities affiliates were very successful after a short time, and they took over about half of the
investment banking business. They thus represented a real threat to the independent investment banks.
Given time, commercial banks might have slowly whittled down the major product-line and
geographic barriers, but this process was halted abruptly during the Great Depression (1929-33). The
regulations imposed after 1933, which were collectively part of the New Deal reforms, not only halted
the trend toward greater product and geographic diversity, they turned the clock back. The banking sector
became a loosely organized cartel into which entry was difficult and pricing by interest rates was limited.
Competition between different financial intermediaries was sharply reduced, and investment and
commercial banking were separated. Indeed, a very narrow definition of a commercial bank, in terms of
geography and products, prevailed after this period.
Although many new forms of control were added to the banking system, the most prominent of
these was deposit insurance, which was first offered to commercial banks, then to savings and loans and
mutual savings banks, and finally to credit unions. In fact, deposit insurance is probably the most
important monument of the New Deal reforms. Although many other regulations have disappeared,
deposit insurance remains in place. Interest rate controls, which had a long and tortured history, were
3finally consigned to the dust bin of history in 1980-86, and barriers to branching-especially  interstate
branching-have  weakened and partly disappeared in the last ten years. Limitations on products are
much more resilient, and deposit insurance remains universally acclaimed. Furthermore, its coverage has
grown over time and there is little political will in the United States to substantially alter deposit
insurance.
Behind this attitude stands the firm conviction of policymakers and many economists that
deposit insurance was adopted purely out of public interest to guarantee the stability of the banking
system. But this chapter will show that deposit insurance was-adopted because of the success of a very
narrow group of special interests that wanted to tilt the structure of the financial system in their favor.
Deposit insurance was a U.S. invention arising from the politics of the U.S. banking system in the
Depression years. It is an invention that does not merit international imitation.
The History of Deposit Insurance
The adoption of federal deposit insurance in the Banking Act of 1933 represented a remarkable change in
public opinion. Until the 1930s there was very little support for nationwide deposit insurance. Even after
the banking crisis of 1933 strong opposition remained. One authority on U.S. banking and U.S. banking
history, Carter Golembe, noted in 1960 that, "Deposit insurance was not a novel idea. It was not untried.
Protection of the small depositor, while important, was not its primary purpose. And finally, it was the
only important piece of legislation during the New Deal's famous 100 Days, which was neither requested
nor supported by the administration."
How did deposit insurance emerge in the United States? The congressional debate-deposit
insurance was passed in 1933 amid a vigorous discussion-makes  very interesting reading. Economists
often consider congressmen as being relatively ill-informed of the merits of any piece of legislation. But
in the debate over deposit insurance, they discussed moral hazard, adverse selection, and incentive
4compatibility. They were well aware of these issues, given the previous experience with deposit
insurance at the state level.
Six states before the Civil War and eight states after the Civil War had adopted deposit insurance
(table 5.1). The motivation behind all of these insurance schemes was to maintain the stability of small
unit banks and insulate them from recurrent economic disruptions and bank failures. All fourteen states
that enacted deposit insurance between 1829 and 1917 were unit banking states that were trying to find
ways to stabilize the banking system. In a sense, we can think of these states as small and diversified
economies, trying to find a way to protect their banking system. The other states chose to follow the
Canadian or Scottish system of brahch banking, and they did not show much interest il deposit
insurance.
Experimenting with Deposit Insurance
Among the pre-Civil War systems there were three success and three failures. Their performnance  can be
related to the ways in which incentives for deposit insurance were set up. The three successes were the
systems in Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio. But these systems included a very small number of banks, which had
strong incentives to police one another. They were mutual guarantee systems-if  one bank failed the
other banks were obliged to repay its creditors in full. This approach created a very effective cartel,
which was good for maintaining bank safety but not efficiency.
The unsuccessful pre-Civil War experiments-Michigan,  New York, and Vermont-were  much
more like later deposit insurance systems, including the federal system. The industry was not cartelized,
assessments were fixed, and supervision provided by the states was very weak. These three systems
produced very large bank failures, sufficiently large to bankrupt the insurance fund, and note holders and
deposit holders suffered losses.
5A second round of experimentation with guarantee systems was stimulated by the panic of 1907
(table 5.1). As was the case with the pre-Civil War deposit insurance systems, these systems were
established in unit banking states. The six states adopted the design features of the failed antebellum
systems. Their systems suffered very large losses and went bankrupt in the 1  920s because of poor
incentive mechanisms. These insured banking systems suffered the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection, and there was a large increase in the number of banks that failed in the agricultural
decline of 1920s.
By the 1920s unit banking in the United States came under very strong economic pressure
because of the post-World War I recession and the decline in agricultural prices. Banks failed at
historically high rates even as the rest of the economy continued to thrive. The surviving banks faced
tougher competition, and the failure of small banks in the 1920s began to erode the barriers to branching.
In this environment smaller unit banks found it harder to compete, and they turned to the political arena
to secure protection.
The protection they were most eager to secure was federal deposit insurance. Federal deposit
insurance was an old remedy, first proposed in Congress in 1886. Between 1886 and 1933, 150 bills for
different types of deposit insurance schemes were introduced in Congress. Although these proposals
differed in their particulars, they shared the fundamental features of the eight post- 1907 systems-fixed
assessments and modest regulations. Such schemes involved cross-subsidization of risk across states:
states with higher risks of failure would gain at the expense of states with lower risks of failure. One
would thus expect the bankers in vulnerable states, and hence the members of Congress from those
states, to favor a national insurance scheme. But one important problem arose. Compared with state
insurance schemes, federal deposit insurance was very attractive to those states that had high-risk
banking systems because of these undiversified unit banks. But at the same time, it was less likely to pass
because the branching states-those  witlh  larger, urban, diversified banks-also  had very powerful voices
6in Congress. These two groups were evenly balanced for a long time, preventing legislation from making
headway before 1933.
Batting for  Deposit Insurance
It is striking that deposit insurance was adopted in 1933, because the weakening position of smaller,
particularly rural unit banks should have made them less effective as a special interest group. Their
decline should have led to a reduction in the likelihood of federal deposit insurance schemes. But by
1932 the reverse occurred: there was a nationwide call for deposit insurance. And surprisingly, even
members of Congress from states iii which branch banking was strong pushed for some form of deposit
insurance. This change occurred largely because of the extreme, unrelenting, and mistaken monetary
contraction engineered by the Federal Reserve beginning in 1929. This contraction provoked large-scale
bank failures and gave the political entrepreneurs in Washington the opportunity to press for their own
special-interest remedies.
The key to the success of deposit insurance in this new environment was the chairman of the
House Banking Committee, Representative Henry Steagall, Democrat of Alabama. He assumed the
office in 1930 and was a very strong advocate of state deposit insurance. He held that deposit insurance
was necessary for the survival of the unit banking system, and he had a strong aversion to any form of
branching within states or across state boundaries. The House Committee thus had a chairman whose
position on deposit insurance was unyielding and who would use the power of his office to secure it.
Deposit insurance had equally powerful opponents in Congress, the most important of which was
Senator Carter Glass, who held sway over the Senate Banking Committee. He pushed his own panacea,
which was to separate commercial and investment banking. According to this throwback to the real bills
doctrine, separating commercial and investment banking activities made the banking system safe again.
7Steagall would not accept any banking bill that did not include deposit insurance and Glass would not
consent to any bill that included it. Thus, very little moved in the way of banking reform in 1931 or 1932.
Looking back as far as the elections of 1932, there is little reason to think that deposit insurance
had much of a chance. The Democratic Party, whichi  was confident of victory given that the Republicans
had been blamed for the Depression, did not mention deposit insurance in their party platform. Senator
Glass had Roosevelt's ear, ensuring the separation of commercial banking but not the passage of federal
deposit insurance. The key to the success of deposit insurance was the absence of any change in the
Federal Reserve's deflationary monetary policy. As more banks failed, the crisis in the payment system
intensified. States that were afraid that their banking systems would collapse declared bank holidays-a
nice name for shutting down the banking system. They decided that it was better to shut down the
banking system and prevent anyone from withdrawing money rather than to let banks fail en masse.
Nevada began the practice, declaring a holiday in October 1932, and the process slowly built up
speed. By March 3, 1933 thirty-six states had some form of banking holiday. When Roosevelt took
office, there was some talk of a possible devaluation. Fear of a run on the dollar encouraged the Federal
Reserve to raise the discount rate, worsening banking problems. Thus on March 6, 1933 Roosevelt
ordered a national bank holiday, shutting down the entire banking system to halt this crisis. On March  II
a partial opening of the banking system began, but only strong banks were allowed to open. When the
banking holiday ended only 12,000 banks opened with $23 billion worth of deposits, and another 5,000
banks remained unlicensed. Unopened banks held more than $3 billion. These figures stand in contrast to
the end of December 1932, when about 18,000 banks were open, holding $28 billion in deposits. In this
environment Congress began to debate what to do.
Explaining Congress's Response
8To put this dramatic banking collapse in perspective it is useful to it to compare it with today's savings
and loan problems. Between 1930 and 1933, 9,000 banks were suspended, incurring losses of $2.5
billion, half of which was borne by depositors and half by shareholders and other creditors. How do these
losses compare with the costs of today's savings and loan problems? At most, the price level has risen
about ten-fold, making these losses about $25 billion. As the savings and loan crisis cost about $200
billion, the Great Depression losses seem small by comparison. The political economy of how losses are
shared explains why we had a major banking reform in the 1930s but relatively little changed in the
1980s, even though the crisis involved larger sums.
What happened in Congress in 1993 is very interesting because Congress decided not to bail out
the depositors at this time. There were petitions to do so, and a few members of Congress suggested the
idea, but Congress did not aid injured depositors. Instead, it adopted a system of deposit insurance that
protected the existing safe banks, and hence their depositors in the future. The political change that led to
the adoption of deposit insurance was the result of widespread losses suffered by depositors. Although
there were years of high losses before the Great Depression, 1930-33 was a watershed (figure 5.1). The
president, the secretary of the treasury, the head of the Senate Banking Committee, and the American
Bankers Association were all opposed to deposit insurance. Even the Federal Reserve, which was not
allowed to speak on the issue, was quietly opposed to it. This coalition was formidable opposition, and
they offered all the arguments good economists today give in favor of deposit insurance. But they were
overcome by the unit banking lobbying, bolstered by the public's fear over the safety of their deposits.
The public's trust in banks changed radically during the Great Depression, partially because
bankers were portrayed as perpetrators, rather than victims of the Depression in the media and in
congressional hearings. In cartoons bankers were caricatured as gangsters wearing top hats and playing
craps with their depositors funds. The media thus helped Steagall, who was an astute political
entrepreneur. He responded to the deadlock with Glass in Congress by wooing the public. At the same
9time Steagall was careful to argue in Congress that he was designing a system that would avoid moral
hazard and adverse selection problems.
Until the 1920s, even though depositors made losses, very few people outside of unit bankers
were interested in or talked about a deposit insurance system because losses were modest and limited.
But when the failure of the 1930s occurred, everyone, even if they haven't suffered a loss, felt threatened
because they knew people who had lost money. In this kind of environment the public was willing to
listen to a credible panacea. And this change gave Steagall enough power to block all other banking
legislation and secure Glass' acquiescence and the President's-signature.
The Banking Act of 1933 set up a temporary insurance fund, and a permanent insurance fund
was established in 1935. The temporary insurance fund was very limited, reflecting the initial
compromise. It insured only $2,500 worth of deposits. The Banking Act of 1935 raised this amount to
$5,000. Insured banks were charged a premium of one-twelfth of one percent of their deposits. This
legislation represented a clear victory for the small rural banks and lower-income people with small
accounts. The losers were the large city banks and wealthy depositors, who, in effect, were being taxed to
pay the premium for insuring small accounts. Depositors in failed banks also lost because they were not
bailed out. Innovating activity that built larger, stronger banks was thus brought to a halt, and the system
was frozen.
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance Reforms
The passage of deposit insurance in the United States is an informative episode about the political
economy of financial regulation. Unit banks would never have been able to, by their own lobbying effort,
overcome the opposition of the stronger urban branching banks had the Great Depression not occurred
and mobilized the public, who took comfort in the idea of deposit insurance regardless of its long-term
10consequences. Once protected, the public ignored the issue of deposit insurance and again lost interest in
the political debate. The politics of banking regulation returned to the smoke-filled rooms of Congress,
where special interests vied with one another for influence over legislation.
The next bill on deposit insurance was the Deposit Insurance Act of 1950. Small banks pressed
for an increase in coverage to $10,000 (table 5.2). War time inflation had reduced the real value of the
$5,000 maximum (in 1980 dollars) from $30,000 to about $17,000. They were also finding it harder to
compete with large banks. Large banks opposed the increase in insurance coverage. But they were
induced to compromise by the offer of a prorated rebate of assessments. The insurance fund was growing
in the absence of major failures. But this compromise was a devil's pact because insurance coverage was
increased in real terms while the growth of the fund was retarded by rebating. But given the insurance,
the public was not alarmed by this deal.
Looking at the trend in deposit insurance over the course of the century, there is an almost
inexorable expansion of protection, moving farther and farther away from limited coverage and a mutual
guarantee of bank funds. This movement is driven by special interests who, once they had their foot in
the door, began to push for more. There is a steady upward climb of the percentage insured, driven partly
by increasing limits, but also by an increasingly informed public creating multiple accounts. Thus
insured deposits increased from 45 percent to nearly 80 percent. With higher coverage, less monitoring
took place as more and more deposits were insured. This higher coverage combined with the "Too Big to
Fail" doctrine made coverage nearly universal.
Turning to the moral hazard consequences of deposit insurance, some explanation must be given
as to why it took so long for moral hazard to manifest itself in the banking system. Following the
establishment of deposit insurance, banks were very safe, and it took them a long time to change. They
were safe because the Great Depression profoundly altered bank portfolios. It shrank bank deposits and
bank loans. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that banks got out of the business of lending. In World
11War II banks and savings and loans stuffed their portfolios with government bonds. Hence, by 1950
these were very safe institutions, given the dual shocks of the Great Depression and World War II. They
also faced tight regulations. It took banks a long time to unwind from this position. Eventually,
competition stimulated them to take more risk, and it was only in the 1970s that increased risk-taking
was first noticed. The disasters of commercial banking and savings and loans after the 1970s were the
result of allowing insured banks to enter more-risky areas of activity, while limiting examinations,
supervision, and discipline.
What to do? Should deposit insurance be recommended? The short answer is no. The historical
record teaches three lessons. First, deposit insurance wvas  not adopted primarily to protect the depositor.
There were many ways to increase the soundness of the banking system, and the problems of deposit
insurance were well known from the state experiments that proceeded the FDIC. The leading alternative,
with which contemporaries had experience, was to allow branching and the diversification of institutions
by geography and product line. But monetary contraction and the politics of the banking crisis
empowered the small unit banks. Second, the historical record of federal and state insurance plans shows
that it is all but impossible to escape the moral hazard and other problems inherent in deposit insurance.
This is also true for Canada, which adopted deposit insurance in 1967, and soon began to experience
similar kinds of problems. Third, in setting up banking regulations, including deposit insurance, a
banking lobby will be created that will campaign in the future to protect the industry as it stands, and the
industry will be pushed in a particular direction on a course that will be difficult to alter. The state
experiences also contain one lesson: if the government is willing to reduce competition, allow tight
cartelization, and impose tight supervision and control, deposit insurance can work for at least twenty
years.
Although history does not recommend deposit insurance, it does show that the public is greatly
concerned about the safety of its deposits. U.S. financial history is littered with all kinds of schemes to
12protect depositors or to protect note holders. The designs of these systems were influenced by special
interests, but they were also driven by the public's desire for protection. The key problem is one of
information. For the vast banking public, that is, households and small businesses, it is very costly to
monitor the performance of banks and decide which is the safest choice among all alternatives. If
deposits of each bank are unequally safe, choosing is a difficult task, particularly when the economy is
subject to economic fluctuations, and there is a dispersion of performance by institution.
What plan could a policymaker offer that would not have all the perverse effects of deposit
insurance? History provides at least one alternative: regulators could require each bank to offer deposit
accounts that are segregated, treasary bill mutual funds. Banks could then advertise these funds as safe
assets, perhaps guaranteed or backed by the government. This type of account is in effect insurance from
the government, offering the same guarantee as government bonds. But it removes the wrong incentives
for financial institutions that arise from insuring bank deposits. There is a strong historical precedent for
this type of arrangement (see chapter 4).
Between 1864 and 1914 the creation of currency was the task of national banks. These bank
notes were backed by U.S. government bonds. They became completely safe assets regardless of which
institution issued them. National banks did fail, but never because of note issuing, and no note holder
ever experienced a loss. The system allowed people to choose between safe national bank notes, which
bore no interest, and deposits, which were not safe but carried interest. This system functioned very well.
Other monetary and banking issues created problems, including the absence of a central bank until 1913,
but the public was generally very satisfied with national bank notes.
To conclude, deposit insurance was the peculiar creation of the U.S. banking experience
generated by some of the worst features of the system. It is inappropriate for developing or transition
economies. Deposit insurance presents enormous incentive problems and requires additional regulations
and close supervision to make it workable in the short run. These conditions may demand too much from
13bank regulators in developing countries, as it did for regulators in the United States. There are simpler,
less-costly alternatives that may achieve the same basic objective.
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16Table  5.1
Pre-FDIC Insurance  Systems
New York  Safety fund with upper limit on
1829-1866  assessments, limited regulatory authority
Vermont  Safety fund with upper bound on
183  1-1858  assessments, limited regulatory authority
Michigan  Safety fund with upper bound on
1836-1842  assessments, limited regulatory authority
Indiana  Cartelized Industry, Mutual  Guarantee
1834-1865  Without Limit, Strict Supervision  &
Enforcement
Ohio  Restricted  Membership, Nlutual  Guarantee
1845-1866  Without Limit, Strict Supervision  &
Enforcement
Iowa  Cartelized Industry, Mutual  Guarantee
1858-1866  Without Limit, Strict Supervision  &
Enforcement
Oklahoma  Limited  regulatory authority
1907-09  Unlimited special assessments
1909-23  Upper bound on annual assessments.
Texas.  Safety fund with upper bound on
1909-1925  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
Kansas  Safety fund with upper bound on
1909-1929  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
Nebraska  Safety fund with upper bound on
1909-1930  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
South Dakota  Safety fund with upper bound on
1909-1931  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
North Dakota  Safety fund with upper bound on
1917-1929  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
Washington  Safety fund with upper bound on
1917-1929  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
Mississippi  Safety fund with upper bound on
1914-1930  assessments,  weak regulatory authority
Source:  Calomiris (1989); White (1983).
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Nlaxirinum  insured  adjusted for
Years  dep.osit  aimount  inflation
(1980 dollars)
1934-1949  .5)'00  9  $30,800 - 17,300
1950-1965  100 00  $34,200  - 26,150
1966-1968  $Si. 0O(  $38,150-35,500
1969-1973  $2(J).0  $45,800 - 37, 1  00
1974-1979  S40,000  $66,850 - 45,400
1980-1989  $1  0,0OQ  $100,000 - 66,450
S'ource:  White. The S&l  L)elbacile  (i!  991).
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